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Kon-Tiki Experiments 
 
Abstract 
We identify a species of experiment—Kon-Tiki experiments—used to demonstrate the com-
petence of a cause to produce a certain effect, and we examine their role in the historical sci-
ences. We argue Kon-Tiki experiments are used to test middle-range theory, to test assump-
tions within historical narratives, and to open new avenues of inquiry. We show how the re-
sults of Kon-Tiki experiments are involved in projective (rather than consequentialist) infer-
ences, and we argue (against Kyle Stanford) that reliance on projective inferences does not 
provide historical scientists with any special protection against the problem of unconceived 
alternatives. 
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1. The Voyage of Kon-Tiki 
In 1947, Thor Heyerdahl and a small crew set sail from Peru on a balsa raft, hoping to 
reach Rapa Nui (Easter Island). Heyerdahl was convinced that the island was initially settled 
via such a voyage. Though it never gained a foothold in academic circles, Heyerdahl’s hy-
pothesis possessed some explanatory power: it accounted for linguistic parallels between an-
cient Polynesian and Peruvian societies and for continuity in material culture, and it was con-
sistent with the legends of both societies (Heyerdahl 1990, 138–39). However, Heyerdahl 
faced one seemingly insurmountable challenge: ancient Peruvians only had balsa rafts, 
thought insufficient for the long sea voyage. Heyerdahl embarked from Peru to show such 
rafts could survive the trip, and thereby to “destroy one of the weightiest arguments against 
the theory” (Heyerdahl 1990, 26). 
Heyerdahl’s voyage is a paradigmatic example of a Kon-Tiki experiment, a species of 
scientific experiment philosophers have hitherto underappreciated. Kon-Tiki experiments at-
tempt to demonstrate the competence of a cause to produce some effect, usually with the aim 
of projecting the operation of that cause to some otherwise experimentally intractable system, 
e.g., targets in the distant past. 
We argue that Kon-Tiki experiments play a central role in scientific reconstructions of 
the deep past.1 They do so in virtue of providing evidence that can be invoked in inductive 
                                                 
1 Other prominent examples of Kon-Tiki experiments in the historical sciences are the recon-
struction of stone tools to test the kinds of marks they might leave on butchered kills (Jeffares 
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projections. We distinguish two species of projection (general projection and specific projec-
tion) and argue that these differ in the sorts of considerations that support them. 
A caveat: our analysis doesn’t commit us to any particular notion of “experiment” or ac-
count of the epistemic powers of experimentation per se (for discussion, see Cleland 2002; 
Parker 2009; Parke 2014; Currie and Levy forthcoming). Rather, we identify an epistemic 
function—testing the capacity of some cause to generate some effect—without providing an 
exhaustive account of the kinds of investigations able to fulfill that function.2 Although the 
term ‘experiment’ picks out a varied bunch of scientific practices, we think the epistemic 
function of Kon-Tiki experiments is sufficiently distinct, unified and important to warrant in-
dependent examination. Relatedly, though we discuss Kon-Tiki experiments in the context of 
                                                 
2008), Rudwick’s method of exploring functional morphology via replicating fossilized 
structures (Rudwick 1964; Turner 2000) and early-life experiments attempting to establish 
whether the Earth’s chemical soup was capable of generating living systems. A possible ex-
ample of a natural Kon-Tiki experiment is the Pinatubo eruption, which is frequently cited in 
investigations of geoengineering as showing that aerosol injection into the atmosphere can 
reduce global temperatures. 
2 For instance, we leave open whether simulations could perform Kon-Tiki experiments. That 
they may be able to is suggested in the simulations used to undermine drift models of Pacific 
migration (Finney 1977), as well as in Turner’s (2009a), Bokulich’s (2018), and Currie’s 
(2018, chaps. 9–10) discussions of simulations in historical science.  
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historical science, we acknowledge that they are not unique to sciences concerned with the 
deep past. However, the importance of Kon-Tiki Experiments in historical science is revela-
tory of their method. 
We begin by developing an abstract characterization of Kon-Tiki experiments via an ex-
amination of Polynesian settlement (section 2), then expand our analysis in light of a second, 
paleobiological case study (section 3). We then demonstrate the importance of Kon-Tiki ex-
periments within the broader context of scientific inquiry. First, we highlight several epis-
temic roles that Kon-Tiki experiments play. Second, we argue that such experiments chal-
lenge common philosophical accounts of historical reconstruction (section 4). Third, we chal-
lenge Kyle Stanford’s (2010, 2011) claim that projective inferences are often insulated from 
the problem of unconceived alternatives (section 5). 
  
2. Kon-Tiki Experiments 
In this section, we expand upon the fate of Heyerdahl’s experiment and use this as the ba-
sis for an abstract characterization of Kon-Tiki experiments. 
 
2.1 Polynesian Migrations 
The Polynesian Pacific is a vast tract of ocean, broken by only the occasional island or 
archipelago. 20th century debate concerning the initial settlement of Polynesia centered on 
two questions. First, was the migration eastward, from Asia, or westward, from the Ameri-
cas? Second, were the migrations intentional or accidental? In professional circles, the former 
  6 
question was decided in favor of eastward migration, but the latter was up for debate. Heyer-
dahl believed that migration was both westward and accidental. He doubted ancient tech-
niques were up to navigating the Pacific and thought settlement occurred inadvertently via 
‘drift voyaging’: caught in the occasional squall, unlucky sailors founded new settlements via 
chancy distribution. Indeed, the Kon-Tiki lacked rudders or other means of being directed. 
Heyerdahl also considered eastward settlement unlikely due to the prevailing westerly Pacific 
winds. With his experiment, he aimed to resuscitate the hypothesis of westward migration via 
drift voyaging.  
Though Heyerdahl arrived safely at Rapa Nui, he failed to convince anthropologists of 
Peruvian settlement. The evidence for eastward settlement—including linguistic and material 
evidence, written records by explorers like James Cook, and cultural continuity—remained 
convincing. For decades, even the more minimal hypothesis of ancient Polynesian-South 
American contact was widely rejected (Lawler 2010), though recent genetic evidence sup-
ports it (Thorsby 2012; Moreno-Mayar et al. 2014). Such contact may have occurred via 
balsa raft voyages, but the evidence is equivocal (Moreno-Mayar et al. 2014).  
Though he failed to convince anthropologists of westward migration, aspects of Heyer-
dahl’s perspective were taken seriously by Andrew Sharp (1966). Sharp accepted eastward 
colonization, but, like Heyerdahl, questioned whether ‘stone-age’ technology and naviga-
tional techniques could be used to explore the Pacific deliberately. Instead, he argued that the 
Pacific was explored via drift voyaging. 
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Sharp’s challenge led to a new set of Kon-Tiki experiments, these examining whether tra-
ditional Polynesian navigational techniques and materials could be used for intentionally ex-
ploring the Pacific. As Ben Finney (1996, 80) recalled decades later: “Those of us who ques-
tioned Sharp’s assertions about the limitations of Polynesian canoes and navigation… as well 
as Heyerdahl’s pronouncements about the impossibility of sailing eastward across the Pa-
cific, soon found that we could not conclusively refute them… to understand the role of in-
digenous technology and skills in voyaging and colonization in Polynesia, we concluded that 
we had to reconstruct the ancient voyaging canoes, relearn the old ways of navigating, and 
then test these on the long sea roads of Polynesia.” 
In 1965, a modern catamaran travelled the Pacific using traditional navigational tech-
niques (Lewis 1994). A decade later, Finney and his team constructed a 40 foot long double-
canoe, Hokule’a (Finney 1977), and over the next two decades undertook a series of voyages 
throughout the Pacific. The early journeys were under the navigation of Mau Piailug, the first 
in 1976 between Hawai’i and Tahiti (about 2.5k miles). “All in all Hokule’a has sailed over 
60,000 nautical miles of open ocean, and on all but a few of her long crossings she has been 
navigated without instruments, charts, or other aids” (Finney 1996, 81). The voyagers relied 
on traditional navigational techniques and on local knowledge about traversing the Pacific. 
For instance, Maori traditions specify a particular part of the year to travel from Rarotonga to 
Aotearoa: precisely when the prevailing westerly winds rest in favor of an easterly direction, 
thus avoiding the headwinds which Heyerdahl thought so damning of eastward migration. 
These, in combination with computer simulations which undermined the chancy models of 
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Sharp’s account, gradually reinstated the view of Polynesian settlers as masterful, intentional 
navigators.  
 
2.2 Abstract Characterization 
We define Kon-Tiki experiments in terms of two key features. First, Kon-Tiki experi-
ments attempt to establish the competence of a cause to produce a particular effect. This is 
accomplished by creating a context in which the cause produces that effect. Heyerdahl, for 
example, constructed a craft similar to those available in prehistoric Peru to test the possibil-
ity of westward migration, while Finney and company used traditional navigational tech-
niques to retrace an eastward migration. Second, with the cause’s competence established, 
the results may be projected to explain particular events beyond the experimental context. 
Heyerdahl took the Kon-Tiki voyage to reflect actual voyages made by ancient Peruvians, 
and Finney saw Hokule’a’s journeys as necessary to ‘conclusively refute’ both westward and 
drift models of Polynesian migration. Both aspects of this definition require further elabora-
tion. The first feature captures an intrinsic property of Kon-Tiki experiments; the second re-
lates them to a broader context of inquiry. 
Our analysis draws on the vera causa tradition in philosophy of science (Novick and 
Scholl 2018; Scholl manuscript). This tradition distinguishes between three epistemic tasks: 
showing that a cause exists, showing that that cause is competent to produce some effect 
type, and showing that that cause is responsible for producing a particular token effect of that 
type (Herschel 1831, sec. 141; Hodge 1977, 1992). 
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Distinct evidence is required for accomplishing each of these epistemic tasks. Evidence 
establishing a cause’s existence leaves open what effects that cause is competent to produce. 
Ancient Peruvians possessing balsa-wood rafts doesn’t demonstrate that the rafts were com-
petent to reach Rapa Nui. Similarly, evidence of a cause’s competencies leaves open which 
particular effects that cause has in fact produced. Showing that Peruvian vessels can reach 
Rapa Nui doesn’t establish that they did. Evidence for existence and competence need not be 
wholly distinct. Causes are known by their effects, so establishing the existence of a cause 
requires establishing at least one of its competencies. However, the full range of effects that a 
cause is competent to produce may be discovered well after establishing the cause’s exist-
ence. The existence of Peruvian rafts was known to western science well before their compe-
tence to reach Rapa Nui was established. Likewise, while establishing a cause’s competence 
to produce some effect type often requires showing that the cause produced some particular 
effect token of that type, this still leaves open whether the cause was responsible for produc-
ing other tokens of that effect type. 
Consider the following epistemic situation: 
(1) an inquirer desires to know the cause(s) responsible for producing some particular 
effect, and 
(2) at least one candidate cause is known to exist (and some evidence may suggest 
that this cause was responsible for producing the effect), however, 
(3) it is unknown whether the cause is competent to produce the effect. 
This is the paradigmatic situation that calls for a Kon-Tiki experiment. Heyerdahl wished 
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to determine what cause was responsible for the colonization of Rapa Nui. He knew of the 
existence of a potential cause (the Peruvians’ balsa rafts), but there was serious reason to 
doubt whether these were competent to make the voyage. Similarly, for Finney and company, 
serious challenges were raised against the competence of traditional navigational techniques 
to support purposeful exploration of the Pacific, and their experiments were designed to ad-
dress these challenges. 
This helps to separate Kon-Tiki experiments from other experiments that seek to probe 
causal competencies. Many experiments demonstrate causal competencies in contrived sce-
narios that never occur outside laboratory settings (Cartwright 1983, 1999; Hacking 1983). 
Because Kon-Tiki experiments are concerned with competency in particular non-laboratory 
contexts, such as whether balsa-wood rafts can traverse the Pacific, they often involve recre-
ating more of the world’s complexity than other experiments.3 In this regard, Kon-Tiki ex-
periments involve an element of re-enactment, although what is re-enacted depends on the 
competencies at hand, the contexts we’re interested in, and the availability of the materials 
involved. Lewis’ voyages re-enacted some Polynesian navigational techniques, while those 
of the Hokule’a also recreated the crafts. Sometimes the element of re-enactment is promi-
nent, as in archaeological cases where tools can be recreated largely as they existed histori-
                                                 
3 For this reason, Kon-Tiki experiments need not be limited to what are traditionally consid-
ered “historical” sciences (ecology, for instance, makes heavy use of them). 
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cally (Jeffares 2008). In the case of experimental taphonomy (considered below), the fossil-
ized organisms under study are often extinct, requiring the use of relevantly similar proxy or-
ganisms.  Generally speaking, all experiments involve some element of departure from natu-
ral states, but it is characteristic of Kon-Tiki experiments to minimize this departure.  
A successful Kon-Tiki experiment (1) tests the competency of a cause (often with a par-
ticular context in mind) in order to (2) inform a debate where the cause’s competency is as-
sumed by some live hypotheses. When the experiment demonstrates causal competence, it 
does so by creating a context in which the cause produces the effect. There can be an asym-
metry between demonstrating competence and incompetence. While the success of Heyer-
dahl’s voyage shows unequivocally that balsa rafts can reach Rapa Nui from Peru, failure to 
reach Rapa Nui would not have shown that such voyages are impossible—any number of 
chance factors could have accounted for the failure. In other contexts, where the role of 
chance factors is more limited (e.g., the experimental taphonomical contexts considered be-
low), this asymmetry is lessened. 
As the aftermath of the Kon-Tiki voyage shows, a demonstration of causal competence 
does not license inferring that the cause was in fact responsible for producing the effect in the 
instance of interest. Heyerdahl arguably committed this fallacy, at least in his popular work. 
By contrast, David Lewis (1966, 94), discussing the implications of his catamaran voyage, 
carefully avoided it: “We have of course done nothing to prove whether the old Maoris [sic] 
made long deliberate voyages or indeed made any at all. What I believe we have demon-
strated is that methods such as they used are accurate enough to render the major traditional 
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voyages navigationally quite feasible.” 
Although the results of a Kon-Tiki experiment are by themselves insufficient to license 
inferences of responsibility, they may serve as the basis for a projection beyond the experi-
mental context. Such projections are the second aspect of our characterization of Kon-Tiki 
experiments. It is here that Heyerdahl failed, whereas Finney et al. succeeded. 
Consider the distinction between projective and consequentialist reasoning (Stanford 
2010, 2011). In consequentialist reasoning, hypotheses are confirmed by checking their em-
pirical consequences. Often, this involves determining which of several hypotheses provides 
the best explanation of a given set of empirical phenomena (Lipton 2004). Inference to the 
best explanation is often taken to be our best window into events that are “remote”: ex-
tremely large, extremely small, from the distant past, very far away, etc. (Cleland 2002; Stan-
ford 2006). 
Stanford (2010, 2011) argues, however, that confirmation sometimes involves projecting 
causes from known to unknown instances, rather than drawing consequences from hypothe-
ses. For example, in experimental taphonomy (Briggs 1995), scientists attempt to recreate 
fossils in the laboratory, and then project their results into nature. 
Projecting from an experimentally demonstrated competence to an actual case requires 
evidence connecting the experimental and historical contexts. Although Heyerdahl estab-
lished competence in his specific experimental instance, simulation evidence undermined the 
projection. Modeling suggested it is unlikely that chancy, drift-based colonization could gen-
erate the widespread migration represented in the historical record (Finney 1977). Further, 
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establishing responsibility—that Peruvian seacraft in fact were the medium of migration, that 
early Polynesians in fact purposefully navigated—requires combining evidence that those 
seacraft are competent to support such migration with evidence that the requisite voyages ac-
tually occurred.4 Here, the myriad evidence supporting the eastward migration scupper the 
westward hypothesis. 
Finally, note the iterative productivity of Finney’s experiments. The journeys led to new 
discoveries. For instance, scientists only realized the relevance and accuracy of traditional 
Maori knowledge about navigating between Aotearoa and Rarotonga once they attempted the 
voyage. Good Kon-Tiki experiments do not simply establish competence, but provide plat-
forms for further discovery (see below, section 4). 
To summarize, Kon-Tiki experiments aim to establish the competence of a cause to gen-
erate some effect. They do so by setting up the relevant cause in the relevant context and see-
ing if it produces the effect. Importantly, they do so for causes known to exist; they do not 
                                                 
4 This illustrates an important point about the distinction between existence, competence, and 
responsibility claims: they are relative to particular causes. A responsibility claim about one 
cause may entail an existence claim about a different cause. In this case, the claim that the 
Peruvians’ rafts were not merely competent to support voyages to Rapa Nui but in fact were 
responsible for supporting such voyages entails that such voyages occurred—that is, existed. 
Relative to one cause (the rafts), it’s a responsibility claim; relative to the other (the voy-
ages), it’s an existence claim. 
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aim to demonstrate the existence of novel causal factors (although surprising results may lead 
to their discovery). In combination with further evidence, the results of a Kon-Tiki experi-
ment can serve as the basis for projecting the cause from the experimental context to some 
target context. We take this second feature, which concerns the role of Kon-Tiki experiments 
within the broader structure of inquiry, to be as essential as the first. We discuss some of the 
complications of projection in the next section. 
 
3. Kon-Tiki Experiments in Paleobiology 
In this section, we develop a second case study. This serves two functions. It shows that 
Kon-Tiki experiments are not restricted to anthropology, furthering our claim that such ex-
periments are a widespread and important feature of successful historical reconstruction. Sec-
ond, the case allows us to clarify the distinction between two types of projection (general and 
specific) that can be made on the basis of Kon-Tiki experiments. 
 
3.1 Experimental Taphonomy 
Experimental taphonomy is a science of Kon-Tiki experiments. By attempting to (par-
tially or fully) recreate fossils of uncertain origin in the laboratory, experimental 
taphonomists demonstrate the (in)competence of known fossilization processes to produce 
fossils from particular types of remains. The hope is that the laboratory demonstration will 
allow for projection from the known case (the laboratory recreations, which establish compe-
tence) to the unknown case (the putative fossils, for which responsibility is in doubt). 
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Consider a 2006 study by Elizabeth Raff and colleagues (2006). Raff et al. performed ex-
periments testing whether marine embryos can maintain structural integrity after death for 
long enough to fossilize. Their study nicely illustrates the requirements of justified inferences 
on the basis of Kon-Tiki experiments. 
Their experiments were motivated by the discovery of putative embryos in Ediacaran age 
rocks (>580 million years old) from the Doushantuo formation. Though initially interpreted 
as algal remains, Xiao and Knoll (1999, 2000) argued that these fossils are most likely meta-
zoan embryos. If that’s correct, they are of immense scientific importance, as they would 
provide a window into the nature of animal development prior to the Cambrian “explosion,” 
the geologically brief period in which the majority of animal phyla first appear in the fossil 
record (Erwin and Valentine 2013). As the Cambrian explosion involved major modifications 
of animal development (Davidson, Peterson, and Cameron 1995), the Doushantuo embryos 
could provide insight into the precise nature of these modifications—if, that is, they are em-
bryos at all. 
There were serious reasons to doubt the embryo interpretation: the “simple geometric 
forms also resemble other organic and inorganic structures,” the putative embryos “are large 
in comparison with many modern embryos,” and the fossils of cleaving embryos are difficult 
to distinguish from the fossils of other multicellular forms (Raff et al. 2006, 5846). But the 
most pressing challenge was the following: “Anyone who works with marine embryos would 
consider preservation for sufficient time for mineralization via phosphatization unlikely, 
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given the seeming fragility of such embryos. Freshly killed marine embryos in normal sea-
water decompose within a few hours” (Raff et al. 2006, 5486). 
This situation resembles that in which Heyerdahl found himself prior to the Kon-Tiki 
voyage. An attractive hypothesis suffered from a potentially fatal flaw: citing an incompetent 
cause. Despite Xiao and Knoll’s arguments that the Doushantuo fossils are early metazoan 
embryos, there was reason to doubt that marine embryos’ morphology could be preserved for 
sufficient time to fossilize. This situation calls for a Kon-Tiki experiment, which Raff and her 
colleagues duly performed. 
Raff et al. (2006) exposed sea urchin embryos to an anoxic reducing environment, in 
which proteins that would otherwise rapidly degrade the embryo are suppressed. Under these 
conditions, cleavage-stage embryos with an intact fertilization envelope preserved their mor-
phology for three weeks. Prehatching blastulae (a later developmental stage) were preserved, 
but did not retain their normal morphology quite as well as cleavage-stage embryos. Post-
hatching stages were not preserved at all. Note that Raff et al. did not actually fossilize the 
embryos. They merely showed that they could preserve their morphology for a sufficient 
length of time for mineralization to occur. This is appropriate, as the issue at hand concerned 
the ability for such tissues to avoid degradation. In this way, Raff et al.’s experiments demon-
strated the competence of an anoxic reducing environment to preserve cleavage-stage marine 
embryos for sufficient time to allow for mineralization, as well as its competence to partially 
preserve prehatching blastulae stages. 
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3.2 General and Specific Projection 
While establishing the various competencies of anoxic reducing environments to preserve 
marine embryos was their most direct result, Raff et al. also drew further conclusions. The 
inferences they made, as well as those they declined to make, illustrate the distinction be-
tween general and specific projection.  
When making a general projection on the basis of a Kon-Tiki experiment, we infer from 
the demonstration of competence in the particular instance to the operation of the cause in 
nature, but do so without necessarily committing to its operation in any particular instance. 
For example, from their Kon-Tiki experiment, Raff et al. infer that sometimes cleavage-stage 
embryos retain their structure long enough to fossilize. This contrasts with special projection, 
in which one attributes to a cause responsibility for producing a particular effect, i.e. one pro-
jects it to a specific case or set of cases. 
The conclusions that Raff and her colleagues drew were not primarily about the 
Doushantuo embryos—they were not, in other words, specific projections. Instead, their con-
clusions mostly concerned taphonomic biases and other general features of the marine em-
bryo fossil record: What sorts of embryos will be discovered? What sorts of information can 
we glean from them? What artifacts must we avoid misinterpreting? Answering such ques-
tions is critical for drawing meaningful inferences from traces. However, this does not re-
quire claiming that any particular fossil is of a marine embryo. In other words, they are ques-
tions addressed by general projection. 
Answering such questions was Raff and colleagues’ primary aim. Thus, they argued that 
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cleavage-stage embryos from a wide phylogenetic spectrum should be found, while post-
hatching stages should not. Later prehatching stages may be found, but with badly preserved 
morphology, so apparent structural features may be artifacts. Finally, they suggested that em-
bryo size should not affect preservation, a surprising claim given that the known record of 
putative fossil embryos is size-biased.  
With these conclusions, the authors engaged in general projection. Their claims con-
cerned the general operation of the cause, not its operation in any particular instance. They 
asked what general features the marine embryo fossil record should possess, not on the basis 
of particular fossil embryos, but on the basis of the causal competencies their experiment 
demonstrated. Insofar as they did discuss the known record of fossil embryos (as when they 
contrasted features of the actual record with those expected on the basis of their results), they 
drew on grounds independent from their experimental results (Donoghue et al. 2006). In this 
way, they projected the biases seen in their experiments into nature in a non-specific way.  
This projection requires that the cause in the laboratory experiment operates in a suffi-
ciently similar manner in nature. Raff et al. provided three strands of justification for this as-
sumption. First, they cited chemical evidence that the chemical used to create the anoxic re-
ducing environment (-mercaptoethanol) is a reliable proxy for the chemical responsible for 
such conditions in ancient oceans (H2S). Second, they provided evidence that anoxic reduc-
ing conditions obtained during the Ediacaran and Cambrian, examining both similar condi-
tions in modern environments and identifying the presence of pyrite (indicating high H2S lev-
els at the time of fossilization) in the putative fossil embryos. Finally, they used phylogenetic 
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reasoning to argue that early metazoans likely possessed fertilization envelopes. 
Raff et al. did draw two conclusions that appear to involve specific projection. First, Raff 
et al. (2006, 5850) argued, “hatched embryos and soft-bodied larvae are unlikely to be pre-
served even under reducing conditions” (a general projection) and that, therefore, “claims of 
fossilized larvae among the Doushantuo fauna […] appear even more unlikely” (a specific 
projection). In this case, they draw on a negative result: an anoxic reducing environment is 
incompetent to preserve hatched embryos and soft-bodied larvae. Therefore, the cause cannot 
be invoked to explain putative fossil larvae in the Doushantuo formation. Note the asym-
metry: establishing a cause’s incompetence directly undermines hypotheses of responsibility 
which rely on that cause’s competence, while establishing competence doesn’t alone estab-
lish responsibility. Thus, the move from incompetence to lack of responsibility requires less 
additional evidence than the move from competence to responsibility. The former only re-
quires that the conditions under which incompetence was demonstrated are realistic (in short, 
it requires successful general projection), while the latter requires additional evidence to es-
tablish responsibility. This is why the apparent incompetence of balsa rafts to make it from 
Peru to Rapa Nui, or for traditional navigation techniques to guide pacific exploration, were 
such powerful objections. 
Second, Raff et al. (2006, 5850) argued that, “although concern has been expressed over 
the patterns of cleavage exhibited by Doushantuo embryos, the equal size of the blastomeres 
within these embryos suggest a rapid death and a faithful representation of the living em-
bryo.” At first glance, it may seem that Raff and colleagues are using their results to argue 
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that the putative Doushantuo embryos are truly embryos. In fact, however, their claims rests 
on hypothetical reasoning. Raff and colleagues take for granted the interpretation of the 
Doushantuo fossils as embryos. If this interpretation were correct, skeptics had argued, then 
the pattern of cleavage the fossils showed was odd. Raff et al. counter by showing how their 
results can explain the pattern of cleavage seen. That is, they show that an existing challenge 
to the marine embryo interpretation fails, but they do not directly project from competence to 
responsibility. It might still turn out that the fossils are not embryos at all, but their hypothet-
ical reasoning would still hold. Thus, this isn't really a specific projection at all, but a general 
projection in disguise. By projecting experimentally determined causal competencies into na-
ture, it removes a challenge to the claim that the Doushantuo fossils are of embryos. 
Thus, Raff et al.’s conclusions primarily involve general projections. We have begun to 
see why this should be so: general projection requires less additional evidence than specific 
projection. The one instance of genuine special projection in the paper involved incompe-
tence rather than competence: if a cause is incompetent to produce an effect in general, then 
it is incompetent to produce particular instances of that effect. In such cases, once the general 
projection is made, the special projection comes for free. 
In summary, a general projection takes us from the results of a Kon-Tiki experiment to 
nature generally but nonspecifically, and requires demonstrating that conditions in the experi-
ment are relevantly similar to some natural conditions. A specific projection claims responsi-
bility for the cause in a particular instance. In cases of competence rather than incompetence, 
this requires further evidence still. 
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4. Prototypical Historical Science 
In recent decades, philosophers of science have seriously investigated methods of histori-
cal reconstruction. Many claim that historical science proceeds via inference to the best ex-
planation on the basis of appeals to common-causes or to consilience (e.g., Sober 1988; 
Wylie 1999; Aviezer Tucker 2004; 2011; Kleinhans, Buskes, and de Regt 2005; 2010; Forber 
and Griffith 2011; Vezér 2017). Although they differ in detail, these views agree that histori-
cal science primarily involves drawing consequentialist inferences from traces.5 The most 
well-known of these accounts is Carol Cleland’s (2001, 2002, 2011, 2013), so we focus on 
hers, but similar arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to the others.  
Cleland claims that historical science progresses via discovering ‘smoking guns’: traces 
(found through fieldwork) that discriminate between existing hypotheses. She characterizes 
this process via an idealized sequence. First, a surprising correlation between traces is identi-
fied. Second, a set of hypotheses about the past which explain these correlations is postu-
lated. Third, further traces are sought which are expected on the basis of some hypotheses in 
the set but not others. These traces are ‘smoking guns’. They empirically discriminate be-
tween hypotheses in a consequentialist manner. For Cleland, this is the primary means of 
                                                 
5 Important exceptions to these accounts of historical reconstruction are Chapman & Wylie 
(2016), Currie (2015, 2017, 2018), Currie & Sterelny (2017), Bromham (2016), O’Malley 
(2016) and Jeffares (2008). 
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testing in historical science. 
Cleland emphasizes that her account is of prototypical historical science: she doesn’t 
claim that all and any historical reconstruction must follow her pattern. Nonetheless, Cle-
land’s model of historical testing is firmly focused on the discovery of new traces—smoking 
guns—which provide consequentionalist tests of historical hypotheses.6 This obscures the 
critical role which projective inference from Kon-Tiki experiments play in many debates be-
tween archaeologists, paleontologists and other scientists concerned with the deep past.  
Against this focus on consequentionalist, trace-based reasoning, we contend that Kon-
Tiki experiments play three distinct epistemic roles: testing middle-range theory, testing cen-
tral assumptions in historical narratives, and opening fruitful new avenues of research. If 
Kon-Tiki experiments are as important as we think, then approaches like Cleland’s miss a 
critical part of prototypical historical science. 
Kon-Tiki experiments play a role in testing middle-range theory: hypotheses that explain 
the formation of traces and thereby allow inferences from traces to their causes (Kosso 2001; 
Jeffares 2008). Raff et al., for instance, infer that soft-bodied larvae and hatched embryos are 
                                                 
6 Cleland provides both an account of method in historical reconstruction (testing via smok-
ing guns) and its justification (common cause reasoning backed up by general but a posteri-
ori facts about the world, namely the overdetermination of the past by the present). Note that 
our complaint is compatible with her account of justification, but not of her account of 
method. 
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unlikely to be preserved. This claim counters interpretations of the Doushantuo traces in 
terms of those morphologies. In other words, Raff et al. use their Kon-Tiki experiment to re-
ject the inference from the known traces to a particular hypothetical cause. Kon-Tiki experi-
ments are not limited to challenging inferences, however. Ben Jeffares provides a positive 
example: he describes a classic Kon-Tiki experiment involving paleoanthropologists butcher-
ing carcasses using replica stone hand-tools and comparing the marks to those left by dogs, in 
order to determine whether older bones were butchered by Sapiens or carnivores. As Jeffares 
points out, such experiments put pressure on Cleland’s distinction between prototypical ex-
perimental and historical sciences (cf. O’Malley 2016).  
Beyond testing whether a particular kind of historical process could produce the target 
traces, Kon-Tiki experiments can also test more general narratives about historical patterns. 
Consider the relationship between the original Kon-Tiki voyage and that of Hokule’a. Heyer-
dahl asked whether it is possible for balsa-wood craft to make it from Peru to Rapa Nui, a 
critical plank in the westward-migration theory. Finney and his team asked whether tradi-
tional navigation techniques are capable of underwriting intentional migration through the 
Pacific, a key element of their model of eastward Pacific migration. In this case, there was no 
particular link between a trace and a historical process being probed—they were not testing a 
particular middle-range theory—but were instead testing an important assumption in a histor-
ical narrative. 
Finally, Kon-Tiki experiments are often productive beyond providing tests of middle-
range theories and historical narratives. Hokule’a’s voyages revealed the significance of 
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Maori traditional knowledge about travel to Aotearoa. Raff et al.’s experiments revealed an 
established pattern (the size bias in the marine embryo fossil record) to be an anomaly in 
need of further research and explanation. Experimentally probing causal capacities opens 
new, fruitful avenues of research.7 
Kon-Tiki experiments are a central feature of historical science. Therefore, establishing 
causal competencies via Kon-Tiki experiments should be included in any idealized or proto-
typical account of method in those sciences. Kon-Tiki experiments establish the very links 
between traces and the past on which smoking guns rely, test the validity of historical narra-
tives, and expand our toolkit for understanding the past. An historical scientist engaging in a 
Kon-Tiki experiment is not acting out of character. They are simply doing what historical 
scientists do. 
Cleland has responded to this sort of objection by arguing that the regularities captured 
by middle-range theory, while important to historical science, are mere auxiliaries to the real 
business of historical reconstruction: trace-based inference. As she says in response to a simi-
lar point from Jeffares (2008): “[G]eneralizations of this sort play a secondary role in histori-
cal research. They are not the targets of historical research but rather useful tools borrowed 
from other disciplines for special purposes” (Cleland 2011, 566). 
                                                 
7 To be clear, we are not claiming that this feature distinguishes Kon-Tiki experiments from 
other sorts of experiments, merely that it is an important role that Kon-Tiki experiments play 
in historical inquiry. 
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This mischaracterizes historical science. First, even granting that historical research is 
centrally concerned with explaining traces, the ‘inference tools’ historical scientists develop 
are not simply ‘borrowed’ from other disciplines. They are developed within the historical 
sciences and geared towards the local, idiosyncratic needs of historical inference (Chapman 
and Wylie 2016, chap. 4; Currie 2018, 262–65). Kon-Tiki experiments are among the central 
“in-house” methods that historical scientists have at their disposal for developing these infer-
ence tools. They are not properly treated as being of merely secondary importance.  
Second, we’ve shown that Kon-Tiki experiments do not play second-fiddle to smoking 
guns in debates between historical scientists. The debate concerning whether the Pacific was 
settled via drift or purposeful navigation centred on clashing Kon-Tiki experiments. The 
proper interpretation of the Doushantuo fossils (if they are fossils at all) turned on Raff and 
colleagues’ examination of the conditions of fossilization. In such debates, Kon-Tiki experi-
ments are not ‘secondary’. For Cleland, prototypical debates turn on finding new traces, new 
‘smoking guns’. This doesn’t capture the cases we’ve examined, and these cases are not unu-
sual (see footnote 1). Further, the productive nature of Kon-Tiki experiments plays an im-
portant role in driving and shaping historical research. Sometimes it is not the discovery of 
new traces, but the discovery of new causal competencies, that open up historical research. 
Third, although Cleland characterizes prototypical historical science as narrowly con-
cerned with making particular inferences about particular events and processes in the deep 
past, this can be questioned. Although Kon-Tiki experiments are often made with particular 
instances in mind, we’ve highlighted how they are often used to make general projections. 
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The role of general projections supports a picture of historical scientists being interested in 
establishing and examining the general capacities of historical causes and regularities (Jef-
fares 2008; Turner 2009b; Currie 2018, chap. 7) and linking these to narrative explanations 
of the past (Currie 2017; Currie and Sterelny 2017). This is a richer enterprise than merely 
explaining contemporary patterns, and one where establishing the competence of causes to 
produce effects via Kon-Tiki experiments plays a central role.  
This final point raises an interesting speculative idea. Perhaps construing historical sci-
ence as narrowly focused on reconstructing the past misses out on a broader aim: understand-
ing the possibilities of existence in their requisite domains. That is, as opposed to caring 
about the paleontological past alone, paleobiologists care about what life on the macroevolu-
tionary scale could be like: exploring possible rather than actual histories. Although our dis-
cussion here is insufficient to establish this (both case studies focused on particular matters of 
history), our account of Kon-Tiki experiments is amenable to it. Regardless, Kon-Tiki exper-
iments are more than a side-show in historical science: they are part of the prototypical busi-
ness of historical reconstruction. 
 
5. Projections and Alternatives 
In the previous section, we considered the strengths of Kon-Tiki experiments. We now 
consider their limitations. In particular, we will challenge Kyle Stanford’s (2010, 2011) re-
cent arguments that projective inference on the basis of Kon-Tiki experiments furnishes his-
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torical scientists with special resources for mitigating the problem of unconceived alterna-
tives. We will show that, although Kon-Tiki experiments play a central role in historical re-
construction, they are vulnerable to unconceived alternatives in their own way.  
In an important book and paper, Stanford has argued that, in at least some contexts, the 
nature of both scientific theorists (Stanford 2006) and scientific communities (Stanford 2015) 
leaves even our best theories undermined by the likelihood that there exist unconceived alter-
natives that, if conceived, would be similarly well-confirmed by the available evidence. This 
motivates his selective anti-realism about science. 
However, Stanford believes that scientists, when able to rely on projective rather than 
consequentialist reasoning, are able to insulate their reasoning from the problem of uncon-
ceived alternatives, by way of generating what Stanford calls an “affirmative challenge” that 
the anti-realist must meet. Stanford takes experimental taphonomy as his central example. 
Since experimental taphonomy makes heavy use of Kon-Tiki experiments, Stanford can be 
understood as claiming that Kon-Tiki experiments have a special role to play in generating an 
affirmative challenge, and thus in helping scientists to mitigate the problem of unconceived 
alternatives. 
In this section, we investigate the relationship between Kon-Tiki experiments, the prob-
lem of unconceived alternatives, and the affirmative challenge. While we agree with Stanford 
about the importance of projective reasoning, we argue it’s still vulnerable to forms of the 
problem of unconceived alternatives. Moreover, the problem affects general projections and 
specific projections differently. Further, we argue that Kon-Tiki experiments cannot generate 
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an affirmative challenge by themselves, but only in combination with further evidence. Thus, 
Kon-Tiki experiments do not furnish historical scientists with any special defense against the 
problem of unconceived alternatives. 
Stanford (2010) presents the affirmative challenge while discussing the hypothesis that 
fossils are the mineralized remains of once-living creatures. He argues that the evidence sup-
porting this hypothesis against neo-Aristotelean and neo-Platonic alternatives was conse-
quentialist and thus vulnerable to unconceived alternatives.8 However, thanks to the evidence 
of experimental taphonomy, it is now supported by the projection of experimental results into 
the distant past. As a result of this shift in reasoning, Stanford argues that the hypothesis is 
insulated against the problem of unconceived alternatives. 
Why think that the switch to projective reasoning has this advantage? According to Stan-
ford (2010, 237), a demonstration of causal competence produces, in some cases, “an affirm-
ative challenge for the suggestion that some alternative process” is responsible for a particu-
lar effect. For the hypothesis of organic fossil origins, the challenge takes this form: if we re-
fuse to project the results of experimental taphonomy to fossils produced in the distant past, 
                                                 
8 The neo-Platonic view took fossils to be a manifestation of a “hidden network of corre-
spondences, analogies, and affinities that linked all the diverse parts of nature into a coherent 
and intelligible whole” (Stanford 2010, 222). The neo-Aristotelean view took fossils to be 
produced by the “forms” of organisms acting on inorganic rather than organic materials 
(Stanford 2010, 223). 
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then (a) “we will then have to explain why the taphonomic processes we have investigated in 
such detail in the field and lab have failed to produce fossils over geological time” or (b) we 
will have to explain “where those fossils have gone” (2010, 237–38). Thus, rejecting the hy-
pothesis of organic fossil origins comes with a heavy explanatory burden. One cannot merely 
provide an alternative mechanism for producing fossils. One must also explain why organic 
remains have failed to fossilize, despite the existence of processes competent to produce 
them, or why, despite the fact that fossils of organic remains have been produced, we have 
failed to find any of them. The anti-realist is challenged to provide such an explanation.9 
It’s important to be clear about which hypotheses are supported by an affirmative chal-
lenge. When we ask, “are fossils the remains of organisms?”, there are multiple questions 
that we might have in mind, and “the hypothesis of organic fossil origins” is ambiguous as to 
the question it is intended to answer. Today, ‘fossils’ are organismic remains by definition, 
so the question should be understood as concerning organism-shaped rocks of disputed 
origin. With this in mind, we can distinguish three questions, each of which bears on the 
question of fossil origins: 
1. Do processes capable of converting organic remains into organism-shaped rocks 
occur in nature? 
                                                 
9 Stanford’s main interlocutor here is Derek Turner (2007), who argues that historical hy-
potheses fare worse, vis-à-vis realism, than experimental hypotheses. 
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2. What proportion of the organism-shaped rocks hitherto discovered are the prod-
ucts of these processes? 
3. Is this particular organism-shaped rock the product of these processes? 
Each of these questions may be answered on the basis of projective reasoning from the 
results of Kon-Tiki experiments. However, different kinds of projection are involved. An-
swering the first question involves general projection: projecting from the processes observed 
in the lab to processes in nature, without attributing any particular effect to the action of 
those processes. Answering the third question involves specific projection: projecting from 
the processes observed in the lab to a specific instance of their operation (in producing the 
putative embryos of the Doushantuo formation, say). The second question is intermediate: 
one takes processes observed in the lab to account for some proportion of a specific set of ef-
fects, but without committing to any particular effect within that set being the product of 
those causes. Henceforth, we call this “intermediate projection.” 
General, intermediate, and specific projection are all vulnerable to the problem of uncon-
ceived alternatives. However, the different types of projection are vulnerable to different 
kinds of alternatives. In what follows, we argue that the affirmative challenge has two parts, 
one of which supports general projection, the other of which supports intermediate projec-
tion. We further argue that the affirmative challenge arises, not in virtue of the evidence pro-
vided by Kon-Tiki experiments alone, but in virtue of additional evidence that supports pro-
jection on the basis of such experiments. 
Let’s start with general projections. Here, the hypothesis of organic fossil origins is not in 
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competition with Aristotelean and Platonic alternatives, for the simple reason that multiple 
kinds of processes, all capable of producing similar effects, can co-exist. It doesn’t matter 
how many real processes are competent to produce mineralized structures resembling organ-
isms. Accumulating alternative processes cannot undermine a general projection, because it 
cannot show that there is not a class of cases produced by the process in question. 
This does not mean that general projection is invulnerable to the problem of unconceived 
alternatives. It means that Aristotelean and Platonic theories are not the relevant alternatives. 
What undermines a general projection is evidence that there are pertinent differences be-
tween the experimental conditions in which the competence was demonstrated and the natu-
ral conditions into which its operation is projected. The reason it would be astonishing if fos-
sils were never produced by the processes studied by experimental taphonomists is that there 
is good evidence that, in many cases, the conditions in which they make fossils can be con-
sidered reasonable simulacra of those in nature. 
This corresponds to the first part of the affirmative challenge for the anti-realist: the chal-
lenge of explaining why a process, revealed in the lab, has failed to occur in nature. By itself, 
this is not much of a challenge: lab environments and nature differ in myriad ways, any num-
ber of which might be relevant to such projection. The affirmative challenge arises only 
when there is evidence that lab conditions are relevantly similar to natural conditions, and is 
only as strong as that evidence. Because Kon-Tiki experiments seek to re-enact natural con-
texts, a good Kon-Tiki experiment requires that such evidence is available. The Kon-Tiki ex-
periment does not itself provide it. Thus, for instance, Raff et al. (2006) needed to provide 
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evidence that sufficiently anoxic environments existed in the deep past and that the chemical 
they used to create such an environment is sufficiently similar to the chemical that would 
have occurred in the natural context. 
The anti-realist, however, need not be especially impressed by this part of the affirmative 
challenge. We are never able to consider every distinction between lab conditions and natural 
conditions—there are too many, and many are unknown (especially when reasoning about 
the deep past). Thus, while the alternative hypothesis (that the process does not occur, or oc-
cur in relevantly similar ways, outside of the lab context) is conceived, many of the potential 
sources of concrete support for this alternative are not. In this way, the problem of uncon-
ceived alternatives rears its head here as well, in the form of the problem of unconceived dif-
ferences (or unconceived relevant factors). Scientists do what they can to mitigate these, 
based on existing knowledge of what causes are relevant, just as they attempt to protect 
against unconceived alternatives when reasoning in a consequentialist fashion. In both cases, 
they rule out as many alternatives as possible, but, in both cases, numerous potentially rele-
vant alternatives remain unconceived. Citing the affirmative challenge amounts to the claim 
that the unconceived differences between lab and natural conditions very likely are insuffi-
cient to threaten the general projection. One is not in a better position regarding sweeping 
claims about the unconceived simply because one is engaged in projective, rather than conse-
quentialist, reasoning. The switch to projective reasoning, enabled by Kon-Tiki experiments, 
changes the shape of the problem, but it does not make it less pressing. 
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Now consider intermediate projections. In the case of organic fossil origins, the interme-
diate projection, which claims that some proportion of known organism-shaped rocks are the 
products of taphonomic processes, is, like general projection, not in direct conflict with alter-
native accounts of how such rocks originate. The claim that many known organism-shaped 
rocks are organic remains is consistent with the claim that some of them are not, and these 
may well have been produced by Aristotelean or Platonic processes.10 We no longer accept 
the existence of such processes, but that’s beside the point. The worry, discussed by Raff et 
al. (2006), that embryo-like forms could be produced by inorganic processes is no challenge 
to the second claim. However, while these alternatives are irrelevant to general projection, 
they are relevant to intermediate projection: alternative theories of fossil origin can become 
part of a relative significance dispute over which accounts for more of the known cases 
(Beatty 1995, 1997). 
The intermediate projection is supported by the second half of the affirmative challenge, 
and understanding this will also clarify how it is vulnerable to the problem of unconceived 
alternatives. The second part of the affirmative challenge assumes that the general projection 
goes through (that the processes occur in nature) and asks why, if they occur, we have failed 
                                                 
10 It’s true that if the hypotheses are construed as each claiming that most (>50%) of the or-
ganism-shaped rocks are the product of a particular process, then they are incompatible. 
However, we’ll see that the second part of the affirmative challenge doesn’t support such 
claims of proportion.    
  34 
to find their traces. If we accept that taphonomic processes occur in nature, it would be quite 
surprising if none of the organism-shaped rocks we’ve discovered were produced by them, 
though it might still be the case that most of them are produced by some alternative process. 
In this case, the relevant alternatives concern the existence of trace-destroying processes in 
nature. If there exist processes that preferentially destroy taphonomic (but not Aristotelean) 
traces, the affirmative challenge can be met. 
Many processes are known to destroy fossils (Turner 2005), and these are routinely in-
voked to explain biases in the fossil record. It is true that known processes are insufficient to 
explain the destruction of all fossils in all circumstances. Nonetheless, it is possible that un-
conceived processes exist that could destroy any fossils that are produced, thus requiring an 
alternative explanation of the origin of organism-shaped rocks. Both features seen in the case 
of general projection are relevant to the case of intermediate projection. First, evidence be-
yond that provided by Kon-Tiki experiments is required to generate the challenge. Second, 
the challenge is only as strong as our grounds for doubting that such unconceived processes 
exist.  
To be clear, we are not claiming that the problem of unconceived alternatives is particu-
larly pressing for general and intermediate projection—we are not arguing for anti-realism. 
The point is that Kon-Tiki experiments do not themselves protect one against the uncon-
ceived. Projective reasoning, as much as consequentialist reasoning, is vulnerable to uncon-
ceived alternatives. Mitigating these problems requires additional evidence that goes beyond 
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that yielded by Kon-Tiki experiments. This undermines Stanford’s appeal to projective rea-
soning as a principle of selection required by his selective realism. If selective realism can be 
defended in this area, it must be on different grounds. 
Lastly, consider the case of specific projection. Only here are the Aristotelean and Pla-
tonic alternatives in direct competition with the hypothesis supported by projection. A partic-
ular organism-shaped rock might have been produced by taphonomic processes or by Aristo-
telean processes, but not by both at once. Or, to give a contemporary example, embryo-like 
forms might be the remains of embryos, or they might be the mere byproducts of purely inor-
ganic processes (Raff et al. 2006), but not both. Conflicts between alternative hypotheses of 
organic origin are also possible. The Doushantuo “embryos” have been interpreted as giant 
sulphur bacteria (Bailey et al. 2007), as encysting protists (Huldtgren et al. 2011; cf. Xiao et 
al. 2012; Huldtgren et al. 2012), and as algae (Zhang and Pratt 2014).11 Specific projections 
are vulnerable to the problem of unconceived alternatives in its classic form, and no affirma-
tive challenge arises. The affirmative challenge applies only in the case of general and inter-
mediate projections. 
Where does this leave us? Kon-Tiki experiments are performed in order to contribute to 
                                                 
11 Though now conceived, these alternatives were not considered in the original defense of 
the embryo interpretation (Knoll, Xiao, and Zhang 1998; Xiao and Knoll 1999, 2000). 
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both general and specific projections; they are less useful for supporting intermediate projec-
tions.12 Consider the case of specific projections first, corresponding to the third question dis-
tinguished above. Was Rapa Nui colonized from the east or from the west? Could the 
Doushantuo fossils be the remains of embryos? Kon-Tiki experiments can help to answer 
these questions, but only when supplementary evidence is available. Since the affirmative 
challenge does not support specific projections, it fails to capture much of what is philosophi-
cally interesting about the role of Kon-Tiki experiments in experimental taphonomy and 
other historical sciences. 
However, Kon-Tiki experiments may also underwrite general projections, and may do so 
even when the specific projection at hand falls through (as occurred in the case of the Kon-
Tiki voyage). Even though Raff et al. (2006)’s embryo-preservation experiments were per-
formed as part of a broader project of showing that the putative embryo fossils of the 
Doushantuo formation really are embryos, the inferences that Raff et al. drew from their 
study were primarily general projections. These projections, however, remain vulnerable to 
the problem of unconceived alternatives. This is most obvious in the case of their projection 
that the embryo fossil record should not be size-biased, since this conflicts with the known 
record. This makes it likely that the affirmative challenge can be met in this case: either there 
is some relevant difference between the lab context and the natural context (meeting the first 
                                                 
12 One of our issues with Stanford’s discussion is that he treats Kon-Tiki experiments as fur-
nishing a strong response to the anti-realist in the context of intermediate projections. 
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part of the affirmative challenge), or there exists some unknown process that preferentially 
destroys smaller embryos (meeting the second part of the affirmative challenge). Alterna-
tively, it may simply be that the known record is not a representative sample of the actual 
record. 
The upshot is that the affirmative challenge should not be understood as a special argu-
ment for local realism. Rather, the challenge is raised and addressed in the course of ordinary 
science. If the challenge is met, formerly accepted projections are rejected or modified. If 
not, these projections continue to be accepted. Thus, we understand the proper role of the af-
firmative challenge in historical science differently than Stanford does. Rather than showing 
how Kon-Tiki experiments are of special interest to the scientific realism debate, it reveals 
the different ways that unconceived alternatives affect the ordinary reasoning of historical 
scientists. 
 
6. Conclusion 
When philosophers have considered the confirmatory power of scientific investigation, 
they have typically focused on either establishing theories about the regular operation of na-
ture (a feature often attributed to ‘experimental science’) or on establishing particular matters 
of fact (often attributed to ‘historical science’). Here, we have focused on a kind of experi-
ment that plays a special role in bridging these aims. Kon-Tiki experiments establish the 
competence of causes to produce certain kinds of effects. We’ve shown that Kon-Tiki experi-
ments test the middle-range theories that are essential to historical reconstruction, as well as 
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in testing features of the sorts of narrative explanations that historical science produces. They 
straddle (and therefore blur) the line between “experimental” and “historical” science. We’ve 
also shown how they relate to the problem of unconceived alternatives. While they do not 
provide any special solace to the realist who hopes to solve the problem, they reveal the di-
versity of forms that this problem takes, and the ways that these diverse forms impinge on 
everyday reasoning in historical science. Consideration of Kon-Tiki experiments furnishes 
another reminder of the diverse and often subtle aims, lines of reasoning, and approaches sci-
entists employ in their quest to understand the natural world. 
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